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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0)
and§78-31a-19(l).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1f

Whether District Court Judge Robert Hilder properly denied Park West

Associates' and Beaver Creek Associates' (hereinafter collectively "Park West") Motion to
Compel Arbitration on the bases that the "arbitration" provision in the parties contract failed to
provide for meaningful arbitration and failed to provide CFI with any meaningful remedy.
"A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law which
[appellate courts] review for correctness." Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996).
2.

Whether Judge Hilder's ruling should also be affirmed on the basis that the instant

dispute between CFI and Park West does not fall within the ambit of the "arbitration" provision
in the parties' contract. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record/
even though that ground or theory was no identified by the lower court as a basis for the ruling."
Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers
Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)).
3.

Whether Judge Hilder's ruling should also be affirmed on the basis that Park West

waived any right it may have had to seek arbitration in this case. "It is well settled that an
appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not
identified by the lower court as a basis for the ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260
1

(Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2, 461
P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section § 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part:
"If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or
deny arbitration accordingly."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l)

Section 78-3 lb-2(4) of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act provides:
"Arbitration means a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals who
hear the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written
award to resolve the issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-2(4).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On June 14, 1998, Park West and CFI entered into a real estate purchase contract (the
"Contract") by which Park West agreed to sell, and CFI agreed to purchase, a twenty-acre parcel
of property in the Canyon Meadows Development in Summit County (the "Frostwood Parcel")
for Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000). Park West breached the Contract by failing to comply
with the terms and conditions of the Contract and by pursuing, instead, an alternative buyer for
the property. Park West wrongfully terminated the Contract and pursued development of the
Frostwood Parcel with another developer. CFI sued Park West for breach of contract and sought
specific performance of the Contract. Park West filed a counterclaim against CFI asserting five
causes of action including a quiet title claim, a breach of contract claim, a claim for breach of the
2

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a claim of waiver and estoppel, and a claim for wrongful
lien.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On November 9, 1999, CFI filed a Complaint in the Third District Court against Park
West seeking specific performance of the Contract and damages for Park West's breach of that
Contract. (R. 1-7). On December 7, 1999, Park West filed its Answer and Counterclaim
seeking, among other things, to quiet title to the Frostwood Parcel. (R. 17-57). On December 8,
1999, Park West filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of CFFs Complaint in its
entirety. On January 10, 2000, the trial court heard arguments on Park West's Motion to
Dismiss. (R. 58-204). On January 14, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry in which it
dismissed CFFs claim for specific performance but not its claim for damages. (R. 423-426).
The Minute Entry was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. (R. 461-477). On
February 4, 2000, the parties participated in an attorney's planning conference and agreed upon
dates for the litigation. (R. 510-512). On February 4, 2000, the parties submftted their stipulated
Scheduling Order to the trial court. (R. 449-451). On March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their
Initial Disclosures. (R. 478-479). On March 9, 2000, Park West filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration. (R. 483-509). Park West's Motion to Compel Arbitration was argued to the trial
court on May 17, 2000. (R. 548). The trial court denied Park West's motion and a formal order
was signed by the Court on May 25, 2000. (549-551). On June 22, 2000, CFI served its first set
of discovery requests on Park West. (R. 556). On June 23, 2000, Park West filed its Notice of
Appeal of the order denying its motion to compel. (R. 552-555). On July 7, 2000, Park West
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings or, Alternatively, Motion for a Protective Order. (R. 576585). The motion was heard by the trial court on August 16, 2000, and a formal order denying
3

the motion was issued on September 5, 2000. (R. 768-770). On September 12, 2000, Park West
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal with this Court which the Court granted on
October 17,2000.
Statement of Retevaivt Facts
The Underlying Dispute
In approximately December of 1997, CFI, a condominium resort developer, began
negotiations with Park West to purchase a parcel of property in Summit County which included
the Frostwood Parcel. The Frostwood Parcel was an attractive investment to CFI because Park
West was offering the property with all of the necessary zoning and permitting requirements in
place. (See Affidavit of David Siegel ("Siegel Affid."), H 7, R. 270). Between December of
1997 and June of 1998, the parties worked out the details of the transaction. (Id,ffif7-12, R.
270-271). On or about June 14, 1998, CFI and Park West executed a Real Estate Purchase
Contract (the "Contract") which provided for the sale of the Frostwood Parcel to CFI for Fifteen
Million Dollars ($15,000,000). ( A true and correct copy of the Contract is attached hereto as
Exhibit A, R. 279-284)). CFI paid Park West an earnest money deposit of $50,000. (Siegel
Affid., f 10, R. 271.).
The sale was scheduled to close on or before December 31, 1998, before which time Park
West was to obtain all of the necessary governmental approvals for CFI's planned condominium
development. (Id at K 18, R. 272-273 & 279-284). Between June and December CFI expended
significant time and resources preparing for the development of the condominium project on the
Frostwood Parcel. (IcL at 16, R. 272). Despite Park West's promises, it failed diligently to
pursue the necessary governmental approvals, allowed the time for closing to lapse, and pursued
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another purchaser for the Frostwood Parcel. (Id. at f^[ 18-28, R. 227-275). CFI initiated its
lawsuit against Park West for specific performance and breach of contract. (Id at 128, R. 275).
The Contract's Dispute Resolution Provisions
The Contract, including its Addendum No. 1, was prepared and signed by the parties on
or about June 14, 1998. (R. 279-284). Addendum 1 to the Contract was not an amendment
and/or modification of the Contract, but rather, an integral part of the Contract which contained
additional terms and clarifications. (Siegel Affid., ^ 13, R. 271-272).
The Contract contains three provisions relating to the resolution of disputes. Those
provisions are found in Sections 15 and 16 of the main body to the Contract and Paragraph 12 of
Addendum 1. Section 15 of the Contract provides in pertinent part as follows:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to
this Contract, including but not limited the disposition of the Earnest Money
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules
of the American Arbitration Association.... If mediation fails, the procedures
applicable to and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in
this provision shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the
Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of a
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard
to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering
the complaint pending mediation. The parties may agree in writing to waive
mediation.
(R. 282) (emphasis added). Section 16 of the Contract further provides that if Seller defaults
under the Contract, Buyer may "sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages." (R. 282).
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract relates to one particular type of dispute—
disagreements over terms. Section 12 provides:
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by the
parties agreed upon by both parties. If agreement cannot be reached within 60
days from the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money
back and this agreement shall be null and void.
5

(R. 283) (emphasis added).
CFI understood Section 12 of Addendum 1 to apply in only one circumstance—when the
parties needed quickly to resolve a disagreement over the terms of the Contract. CFI did not
understand Section 12 to limit its right to pursue litigation against Park West if Park West
breached the Contract and refused to perform. CFI intended to retain its right to sue Park West
for breach of contract. (Siegel Affid., fflf 30-31, R. 275).
On or about the day the Contract was signed, Park West took care to see that provisions
of the Contract were consistent by crossing out certain provisions that were in conflict with other
provisions in the Contract. (Id at f 14, R. 272). Although Park West crossed out certain
provision in the Contract, it did not cross out any provision relating to resolution of disputes.

(14)
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 does not contemplate a binding award from neutral
arbitrators. Rather, the provision contemplates resolution by "agreement" of the parties which
agreement must occur within sixty (60) days. (R. 283). At the hearing on Park West's motion to
compel, Park West's counsel acknowledged: "The exclusive remedy under this arbitration
clause is that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void." (R. 741,11. 13-14) (emphasis
added). See generally the discussion between Judge Hilder and Mark Gaylord at R. 738-742, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
Park West's Pursuit of Litigation Rather Than Arbitration
On November 9, 1999, CFI filed its Complaint for breach of contract, specific
performance and damages. In the Complaint, CFI articulated its willingness to pursue mediation
with Park West and provided that defendants could refrain from answering the Complaint
pending the outcome of the mediation. (R. 1-7)
6

On December 8, 1999, rather than pursuing mediation with CFI, Park West served its
Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint. The Answer included fourteen affirmative
defenses. Nowhere in the Answer or in any of the affirmative defenses, did Park West assert that
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract barred CFI's lawsuit. (R. 50-57).
Although Park West mentioned in its Counterclaim the existence of Paragraph 12, it
made no claims based upon that provision. Instead, it asserted five causes of action against CFI
seeking judgment from the trial court on substantive issues including: 1) a judgment that the
Contract terminated by its own terms, that the lis pendens was void, and that title to the property
in dispute should be quieted in Park West (R. 39, f 46); 2) a judgment that the lis pendens was a
wrongful lien (R. 37, % 55); 3) a judgment that CFI delayed in bringing the action and has waived
its right to assert its claims (R. 36, K 60); 4) a judgment that CFI breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the Contract (R. 36, U 63); and 5) a judgment that CFI breached the
Contract by failing to submit documentation required under the Contract (R. 35, f 67). Park
West, in its Counterclaim, also affirmatively alleged that jurisdiction and venue were proper in
the trial court. (R. 49, ff 4-5). Park West has never filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA
or any other entity.
On December 8, 1999, instead of filing a motion to compel arbitration, Park West filed a
Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. (R. 59-115). Although styled as a motion to dismiss, the
motion was supported with nine affidavits. (R. 116-188). Consequently, Judge Hilder properly
treated the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. (R. 462). The relief set forth
in Park West's Motion to Dismiss was very specific and sought a complete resolution of all
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substantive issues in the case: The motion stated:
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate
purchase contract that automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven
months ago. The contract provided that closing would occur on the earlier of
December 31, 1998 or fifteen days after Final Master Plan approval, that the
"[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density,
zoning and use," and that time was of the essence. Because Summit County
never gave its approval and the transaction failed to close by December 31,
1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by its own terms on
December 31. 1998. Therefore. PWA respectfully requests this Court
dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the grounds that CFI cannot state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

(R. 60) (emphasis added). A true and correct copy of Park West's Motion to Dismiss is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C." At the hearing on Park West's Motion to Dismiss, counsel for
Park West repeatedly emphasized that Park West was seeking a dismissal of the action, not an
order from the Court compelling arbitration. (See R. 662,11. 21-22; R. 685,11. 19-24; R. 728,1.
20 to 729,1. 1).
In a Minute Entry dated January 14, 2000, the Court partially granted Park West's motion
dismissing CFFs claim for specific performance and ordering the release of the lis pendens. The
Court allowed CFI to proceed on its claim for breach of contract and damages. (R. 423-426).
The ruling was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. (R. 461-465).
After the trial court issued its minute entry on Park West's motion to compel, Park West
continued to participate in the litigation. On February 4, 2000, attorneys for CFI and for Park
West participated in a Rule 26(f) attorney's scheduling conference. In that conference, Park
West and CFI discussed the nature of the claims and defenses, agreed upon a date for the
exchange of initial disclosures and set various dates for the litigation. At no time during the
attorney's planning conference did Park West's counsel indicate that Park West would be
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moving to compel arbitration and did not intend to proceed with the litigation as scheduled. (R.
510-512). On February 4, 2000, Park West's counsel executed the proposed Scheduling Order
which was submitted to the Court. The order contained no reference to arbitration. (R. 449451). A true and correct copy of the Scheduling Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." On
March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their initial disclosures. (R. 478-479). Nowhere in Park
West's initial disclosures did Park West indicate its intent to pursue arbitration and seek
dismissal of this action
On March 9, 2000, Park West filed its first Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 483-509).
By the time this motion was filed, Park West had filed and served approximately thirty pleadings
and other papers. (R. 8-13, 17-209, 215-256, 418-421, 449-451, 454-465 & 478-479). CFI had
filed and served approximately 13 pleadings and other papers, most of which were responding to
papers submitted by Park West. (R. 1-7, 14-16, 210, 211-212, 257-354, 358-417, 428-439 &
446-448). By the Motion to Compel, the record already consisted of 482 pages of documents (R.
1-482).
Prior to the filing of Park West's Motion to Compel Arbitration, CFI incurred substantial
legal fees responding to Park West's counterclaim, briefing and arguing Park West's Motion to
Dismiss, discussing the claims and defense and negotiating a Scheduling Order for the action,
preparing initial disclosures, and preparing discovery to be served in the action. (R. 510-512)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Hilder properly concluded that Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract did
not provide CFI with a meaningful option to arbitrate. Judge Hilder also recognized that
Paragraph 12, as interpreted by Park West, provided CFI with no remedy for its breach of
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contract claims. Both of these arguments provided a proper basis upon which to deny Park
West's Motion to Compel. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.
Even if Paragraph 12 was a valid arbitration provision, which it is not, that provision was
only intended to apply to legitimate disagreements over the terms of the parties' Contract. It was
not intended to apply to claims for breach of contract and for termination, which claims were
specifically referenced in, and governed by, Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. Therefore, the
Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on this alternative ground.
Even if Paragraph 12 had provided for meaningful arbitration, which it did not, and even
if CFI's claims for breach of Contract had fallen under that provision, which they do not, Park
West waived its right to pursue arbitration long before it filed its Motion to Compel. By
answering CFI's Complaint without asserting the right of arbitration, filing multiple
counterclaims against CFI for affirmative relief, moving for the complete dismissal of all CFI's
claims and to quiet title to the Frostwood Parcel, and by participating in scheduling, initial
disclosures and other aspects of the litigation, Park West participated in the litigation to a point
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. CFI has been prejudiced by Park West's substantial
participation in the litigation. Therefore, the Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on
this alternative ground of waiver.
ARGUMENT
In the trial court, CFI presented the Court with two bases upon which to deny Park
West's Motion to Compel Arbitration. First, CFI argued that Park West had waived any right it
may have had to arbitrate by its aggressive litigation tactics and failure to timely pursue
arbitration. Second, CFI argued that the clear language of the Contract entitled CFI to pursue
litigation for its breach of contract claims and that the "arbitration" provision in the Contract
10

simply does not apply to those claims. Judge Hilder denied Park West's motion on the
alternative grounds that the "arbitration" provision relied upon by Park West does not provide for
true arbitration and does not provide CFI with an adequate remedy for CFFs breach of contract
claims. Each of these arguments is sufficient in and of itself to support the trial court's decision.1
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PARK WEST'S MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION FOR THE REASONS PROVIDED BY
JUDGE HILDER.

A.

Paragraph 12 Does Not Provide CFI With A Meaningful Arbitration
Option.

It is well settled in this State that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate its contract
disputes unless it has expressly agreed to arbitration. As this Court has recognized, while there is
a public policy which favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of resolving
controversies, "these considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right of access to the
courts unless one waives that right/' Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998).
"Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986). This is
because "a party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's
decision about the merits of its dispute." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed. 2d 985 (1995). Thus, "although there is a
presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to arbitrate when it has
not agreed to do so." Tropical Cruise Lines, S.A. v. Vesta Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 409,
412 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). "We must first conclude that arbitration is a
remedy which has been bargained for by the parties. Only when such agreement on
arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration by liberal interpretation of the arbitration
provisions themselves." Reed v. Davis School Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

1

This Court may affirm the trial Court on any appropriate basis. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1260 (Utah 1998).
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The question before this Court is whether Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract
provides a meaningful arbitration option. The answer lies in the definition of "arbitration." Park
West attempts to compel arbitration under the authority of the Utah Arbitration Act. That Act
does not contain a definition of "arbitration," however, it presumes that an "award" will be
rendered and requires that "[t]he arbitration award shall be in writing." Utah Code Ann. § 7831a-10 (1985). The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, a close companion to the Utah
Arbitration Act, defines "arbitration" as "a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals
who hear the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written award to
resolve the issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-2(4)
(emphasis added). Blacks Law Dictionary defines arbitration as "[a] method of dispute
resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are usu. agreed to by the disputing
parties and whose decision is binding." Blacks Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
Webster's defines "arbitration" as "the hearing and determination of a dispute or the settling of
differences between parties by a person or persons chosen or agreed to by them." Random House
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1999) (emphasis added). Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals
has recognized that "[arbitration customarily results in an award which is enforceable by filing
with the district court and confirmation of the award. Arbitration always includes presentation of
the conflicting claims to a neutral third party or panel for resolution." Reed v. Davis County
School District, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)(arbitration unnecessary because the elements had not been met). It is evident from all
of these sources, that arbitration involves a process that results in a "decision" and/or "award"
from the arbitrator.

12

Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract, simply does not provide for a true
arbitration process and CFI has acknowledged as much. Paragraph 12 provides:
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties
agreed upon by both the Buyer and the Seller. If agreement cannot be reached
within 60 days from the beginning of the arbitration process Buyer shall receive
its money back and this agreement shall be null and void.

(Exhibit A, Addendum 1, Paragraph 12). Although Paragraph 12 uses the term "arbitrate," it
does not require any kind of determination by neutral third parties and does not contemplate an
award. To the contrary, the only resolution contemplated in the provision, if any, is a resolution
by "agreement." Park West's counsel, Mark Gaylord, conceded at the hearing that Paragraph 12
is not an arbitration provision. During the hearing Judge Hilder asked Mr. Gaylord: "But you
don't reach agreement on an arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord? It's imposed upon you." (R. 738,
11. 20-21). Mr. Gaylord had no choice but to concede: "Ordinarily, yes your Honor." (R. 738, L
22). Later in the hearing Mr. Gaylord acknowledged that "[t]he exclusive remedy under this
arbitration clause is that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void." (R. 741,11. 13-14)
(emphasis added). Judge Hilder properly recognized that resolution by "agreement" was not
arbitration and, therefore, the trial court could not compel CFI to arbitrate its claims for breach of
contract.
On appeal, Park West argues that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum provides for arbitration
but simply limits the scope of the arbitrator's authority and the amount of time in which the
arbitration can occur. CFI does not dispute the general proposition that parties may define the
scope of an arbitrator's authority and the amount of time for an arbitration. However, Paragraph
12, as interpreted by Park West, does much more than that. It divests the arbitrator of any
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authority, does away with a meaningful arbitration award, and leaves any "dispute resolution" to
the "agreement" of the parties, if at all.
Park West attempts to support its position by citing three cases from other jurisdictions—
Colorado, Hawaii and Alaska. None of Park West's cases have any binding effect in Utah.
More importantly, none of them support Park West's position. In the Colorado case, the dispute
involved the appointment of an arbitrator affiliated with one of the parties. City and County of
Denver v. District Court. 939 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1997). The Colorado Court concluded that the
parties could contract to use a non-neutral arbitrator "so long as the ADR clause provides for
judicial review of the official's determination." Id at 1365. Significantly, the provision in that
contract contemplated that the dispute would be resolved, not by "agreement" but by the
arbitrator who would "determine the merits of PCL's claims." Id. Thus, City and County of
Denver has no application to this case.
In the Hawaii case cited by Park West, the arbitration clause, unlike Paragraph 12 here,
provided for an award by a neutral third party. In re Clawson. 783 P.2d 1230 (Hawaii 1989).
The parties modified this clause by agreeing to retract the arbitration if the parties settled their
dispute before the issuance of the arbitration award. Id, at 1231. The question on appeal was
whether the parties had reached a settlement before the arbitrator issued his ruling. Id If so, the
award would be vacated. If not, the award would stand. Id at 1232. Because In re Clawson
provided for valid binding arbitration in the event of no "agreement," that case does not support
Park West's interpretation and application of Paragraph 12.
Finally, in the Alaska case, the question was whether the arbitrator had exceeded its
authority in making a particular award. Board of Education v. Ewig, 609 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska
1980). Although the Alaska court recognized that parties are free to define the scope of the
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arbitrator's authority, the court concluded that the arbitrator had fashioned a proper remedy for
the aggrieved party. Id. at 13-14. Nothing in the Ewig case suggests that parties can contract for
an "arbitration" procedure that divests the arbitrator of any authority to decide the merits of the
dispute and provides for no enforceable award. Park West cites the Court to no authority from
Utah or from any other jurisdiction to support its unique interpretation of the law regarding
arbitration.
Before the trial court could compel CFI to arbitrate its claims for breach of contract, the
court had to determine that CFI and Park West had bargained for arbitration. Jenkins v. Percival
962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998); Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). Because Paragraph 12 provides for resolution by "agreement," rather than by an
award or decision from an arbitrator, Paragraph 12 is not an arbitration provision. Therefore,
Judge Hilder properly concluded that CFI could not be compelled to arbitrate its breach of
contract claims.
B.

Paragraph 12, As Interpreted by Park West, Does not Provide CFI
With a Remedy.

Park West argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that Paragraph 12 of the
Contract provided CFI with "a stipulated remedy" in the event that the parties could not reach
"agreement." (See Park West Brief at p. 12). As CFI will explain more fully in the next section
of this brief, Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was never intended by the parties to be a
mechanism for resolving breach of contract or termination claims. Moreover, Judge Hilder
recognized that if Paragraph 12 was interpreted as Park West requests, it would doom CFI "to no
remedy, nothing more than to be back where they were before." (R. 763).
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Park West suggests that the return of CFFs $50,000 earnest money deposit is a proper
remedy for Park West's breach and CFFs resulting loss of a $15,000,000 real estate development
opportunity. Although Park West does not use the terminology, its argument suggests that
Paragraph 12 is a kind of liquidated damages provision. It is clear, however, that Paragraph 12,
as interpreted by Park West, would not survive a liquidated damages analysis.
"Liquidated damages provisions are viewed with some degree of suspicion because they
may not reasonably approximate compensatory damages." Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625
(Utah 1982). "In determining the validity of a liquidated damages provision, this court has
adopted section 339 of the Restatement of Contracts." Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington.
942 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1997) (quoting Reliance Ins. Co.. 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985)).
Section 339 provides:
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, is not
enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is
caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of
accurate estimation."
IcL (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 339 (1932)).
In order to be construed and enforced as a liquidated damages provision, Paragraph 12
must provide a remedy that is a "reasonable forecast of just compensation." I d "Where the
damages provided for in the agreement are disproportionate to the several covenants therein
provided, in some cases being grossly excessive and in others entirely inadequate, they will be
construed as a penalty rather than as liquidated." DOPP v. Richards. 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98,
338 (1913) (emphasis added). Accord Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985)
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(invalidating forfeiture clause in real estate contract that was not a reasonable forecast of
damages); Skeen v. Smith, 75 Utah 464, 286 P. 633 (1930) (acknowledging the standard but
finding that the stipulated damages were not "entirely inadequate").
Here, Paragraph 12 cannot be interpreted and applied as a liquidated damages provision
because the "remedy"—return of the CFFs earnest money deposit—in no way compensates CFI
for its damages. As this Court has recognized, "contractual damages are measured by the lost
benefit of the bargain, i.e, by 'the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed.'" Young Electric Sign Co. v. Standard West,
Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) (finding that the liquidated damages provision reflected this
standard) (quoting Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1995). Returning CFFs
earnest money deposit clearly would not put CFI in the position it would have been had the
contract been performed. In fact, it would not even put CFI in the position it was in prior to
making the Contract. Between the time the Contract was executed and the time that it was
supposed to close, CFI expended significant time and resources getting ready to build the
condominium project contemplated in the Contract. Since Paragraph 12 provides CFI with no
meaningful remedy, it cannot be interpreted as a liquidated damages provision and may not be
enforced as such. Judge Hilder properly denied Park West's motion.
II.

THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD ALSO BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE PARAGRAPH 12 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
INSTANT DISPUTE.
As previously discussed, Paragraph 12 of the addendum does not provide for

meaningful arbitration and, therefore, was not a valid basis for Park West's motion to compel.
However, even if Paragraph 12 had provided for meaningful arbitration of "disagreements over
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the terms" of the Contract, that provision would not govern CFFs claims for breach of contract
and for specific performance.
Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract deal specifically with the resolution of breach of
contract and wrongful termination claims. Section 15 provides in pertinent part:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to
this Contract, including but not limited the disposition of the Earnest Money
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. . . . If mediation fails, the procedures
applicable to and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in
this provision shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the
Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of a
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard
to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering
the complaint pending mediation. The parties may agree in writing to waive
mediation.

(R. 28) (emphasis added). Section 16 of the Contract further provides that if Seller defaults
under the Contract, Buyer may "sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages." Id.
Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Contract are drafted broadly to encompass "any dispute or claim
relating to this Contract." They are also drafted narrowly to deal with any claims for "breach" or
"termination" of the Contract. Paragraphs 15 and 16 were intended to govern the parties'
performance of the contract. Those provisions allow CFI to initiate a suit for breach and/or
termination so long as CFI allows Park West to refrain from answering the complaint pending
mediation.
Unlike Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Contract, Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was drafted
very narrowly and only applies to a "disagreement over the terms of this agreement." Paragraph
12 was intended by the parties to provide an expedited procedure for resolving, in a declaratory
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fashion, legitimate disagreements regarding the terms of the Contract. CFI never thought or
intended that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum would do away with CFFs constitutional right to
pursue its breach of contract claims in the courts. (See Siegel Affid., Tfl[ 30-31, R. 275).
Park West argues that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was intended to supercede the
broader, lengthier and more specific provisions in Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. This
argument is belied by the fact that Park West took the time to cross out from the Contract certain
conflicting provisions while allowing all three dispute resolution provisions to remain. Had Park
West truly intended all disputes under the Contract to be arbitrated, it would have clearly
provided for such and, under no circumstances, would it have allowed Sections 15 and 16 to
remain in the Contract.
It would be improper for this Court, as Park West requests, to read Sections 15 and 16 out
of the Contract. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Baglev & Co., 928 P.2d 1047
(Utah Ct. App. (1996), cert denied. 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997) (quoting Beuhner Block Co. v.
UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)). Hi-Country requires the Court to "harmonize all
of [the Contract's] provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms should be given effect if it
is possible to do so." Id. at 1053. CFFs interpretation of the Contract is reasonable and
harmonizes Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract with Paragraph 12 of the Addendum. Park
West's does not. Therefore, the Court must adopt CFFs interpretation and find that Sections 15
and 16 of the Contract remain valid and enforceable.
CFI sued Park West for breaching the specific provisions of the Contract, for breaching
its obligations of good faith and fair dealing under the Contract, and for specific performance.

2

CFFs Complaint specifically allowed Park West to refrain from answering the Complaint until
the parties had completed their mediation. (R. 4).
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(R. 0001-0007). CFI's claims clearly fall within Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. Therefore,
CFI is entitled to pursue its claims against Park West in the courts and Park West's motion must
be denied.
III.

THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT MAY ALSO BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE PARK WEST WAIVED ANY RIGHT IT HAD TO
ARBITRATE THIS DISPUTE.

Even if Paragraph 12 of the Addendum to the Contract had provided for meaningful
arbitration, which it did not, and even if CFI's claims for breach of Contract had fallen under that
provision, which they do not, Park West waived its right to pursue arbitration long before it filed
its Motion to Compel.
For four months, Park West took advantage of every benefit that litigation had to offer in
the hopes that the trial court would summarily dispose of CFI's claims. Ultimately, the trial
court dismissed CFI's claim for specific performance but declined to dismiss its claims for
damages. Only when Park West failed to achieve a complete dismissal of CFI's claims in the
litigation did Park West decide to shift the remaining claims to arbitration. Having availed itself
of the benefits of litigation and having obtained relief from CFI's primary claim for specific
performance, Park West is not entitled to remove the remaining claims to arbitration.
This Court has consistently recognized that a party, who might otherwise have the right
to arbitrate certain disputes, can waive that right. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d
356, 360 (Utah 1992). In Chandler, the Court recognized that"[t]here is an affirmative duty to
enforce contractual rights [and] it is not the policy of this court to allow a party to suffer
prejudice because an opposing party has failed to timely assert a contractual right." IdL Chandler
adopted a two-prong standard for determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitration.
First, the court must consider whether the party claiming the right to arbitrate has "participate[d]
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in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." IdL Then, the court must
determine whether the other party has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Id. Each of
these standards is met in this case.3
A.

Park West's Participated in the Litigation to a Point Inconsistent with
the Intent to Arbitrate.

In Chandler, the plaintiff filed an action against Blue Cross. Blue Cross answered
Chandlers complaint, "raising seventeen defenses but making no mention of the existence of an
arbitration agreement." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 357. Blue Cross also filed cross claims against a
co-defendant. Id. Blue Cross then participated in five months of discovery with Chandler. IcL
Only then did Blue Cross file its motion to compel arbitration. Id. Based upon these facts the
Court found that Blue Cross had participated in litigation to point inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate.
Several of the facts which led to a finding of waiver in Chandler exist in this case. As in
Chandler, Park West did not respond to CFFs complaint with a demand for arbitration. Instead,
Park West filed an answer with fourteen affirmative defenses, none of which were based upon
the alleged arbitration clause. (R. 50-52). As in Chandler, Park West also asserted affirmative
claims in the action. Whereas in Chandler those claims were against third parties, here, the
claims were made directly against CFI. Park West's Counterclaim asserted five separate causes
3

In footnote 5 to its brief, Park West suggests that CFI bears a higher standard of proof on the
issue of waiver. Park West is wrong. No standard of review applies on the issue of waiver
because Judge Hilder did not decide the motion on the basis of waiver. Judge Hilder concluded
that he could not order arbitration because there was no bona-fide arbitration option. (R. 763). If
he made any findings concerning waiver, those findings were that "there is [sic] certainly actions
by the defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration. On the other hand, there were
actions that were consistent. I am not persuaded that waiver applies in this case . . . " (R. 762).
In any event, because the facts that support CFFs waiver claim are not disputed, this Court may
decide the issue of waiver as a matter of law. See, e.g., Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 940 n.3 (Utah 1993).
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of action against CFI and sought declaratory relief and damages on each. (R. 34-34).
Significantly, the Counterclaim affirmed both the jurisdiction and the venue of the trial court, (R.
43, U 4-7).
This case diverges from the facts in Chandler in that the parties did not get involved in
extensive discovery. This fact, however, is not fatal to CFI's argument. Chandler does not
purport to define all factual scenarios that constitute waiver. To the contrary, the Court realized
that many different fact scenarios would support waiver. IcL at 358-359. This Court relied upon
several factually dissimilar cases from other jurisdictions in which other courts have found
waiver. Several of those cases are strikingly similar to the facts in this case. See Board of Educ.
Taos Mun. Schools v. The Architects, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985); Wood v. Millers National Ins.
Co.. 632 P.2d 1163 (N.M. 1981); Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1162
(5th Cir. 1986); Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Internafl Inc., 398 F.
Supp. 1057, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). CFI urges the Court to look once again to the foregoing
cases, apply the reasoning in those case, and find a waiver here.
The courts in each of the foregoing cases cited in Chandler found a waiver based largely
upon the defendant's filing of one or more substantive motions. Board of Educ. Taos Mun.
Schools, 709 P.2d 184 (waiver due to filing several substantive motions along with motion to
compel arbitration); Wood, 632 P.2d 1163 (waiver due to filing motion for summary judgment);
Price, 791 F.2d 1156 (same) Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd, 398 F. Supp. 1057 (same). As the
New Mexico recognized, "[wjaiver of the right [to arbitration] may be inferred from any
decision to take advantage of the judicial system, whether through discovery or direct invocation
of the court's discretionary power, or both." IcL (emphasis added). "[T]he point of no return is
reached when the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes the court's discretionary power,
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prior to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for arbitration." Id. at 464
(quoting Wood, 632 P.2d at 1156-66). As the Wood case recognized, this rule is necessary
because "[t]o hold otherwise would permit a party to resort to court action until an unfavorable
result is reached and then switch to arbitration." Wood, 632 P.2d at 1166. Compare Weight
Watchers of Quebec Ltd, 398 F. Supp. at 1061 ("the court has not been pointed to and has found
no authority for the proposition that one who answers, seeks summary judgment, and awaits the
decision on such a motion to present the question of arbitration for the first time may then
compel arbitration.").
In this case, Park West filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. (R. 59-115).
Although styled as a motion to dismiss, the motion was supported with nine affidavits. (R. 116188). The motion did not seek to compel arbitration, but rather, sought a dismissal of all of
CFI's claims on the merits. The motion stated:
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase contract
that automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven months ago. The
contract provided that closing would occur on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or
fifteen days after Final Master Plan approval, that the "[ejntire agreement [was]
subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning and use," and that time
was of the essence. Because Summit County never gave its approval, and the
transaction failed to close by December 31, 1998, the Purchase Contract
automatically terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998. Therefore,
PWA respectfully requests this Court dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the
grounds that CFI cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(R. 60) (emphasis added). At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, Park West made it
clear that it was seeking a substantive ruling on all of CFI's claims. Counsel for Park West
requested the Court to "dismiss this action and have quiet title in its favor." (R. 662,11. 21-22).
(See also R. 728,1. 20 to 729,1. 1))
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On January 14, 2000, the trial court issued a detailed minute entry setting forth its ruling
on Park West's Motion to Dismiss. The Court dismissed CFI's primary claim for specific
performance but declined to dismiss CFI's claims against Park West for damages. That ruling
was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. Having obtained the principal relief it
desired from the trial court, Park West then opted to pursue the remaining claims in arbitration.
On March 9, 2000, Park West filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration. By invoking the District
Court's discretionary power and seeking summary judgment on all of CFI's claims, Park West
waived any right it may have had to pursue arbitration.
Finally, Park West engaged in other activities during the litigation, absent in Chandler,
which clearly expressed Park West's intent to litigate rather than mediate. On February 4, 2000,
Park West participated in a Rule 26(f) attorney's scheduling conference. In that conference, Park
West and CFI discussed the nature of the claims and defenses, agreed upon a date for the
exchange of initial disclosures and set various dates for the litigation. At no time during the
attorney's planning conference did counsel for Park West voice its plan to pursue arbitration. (R.
510-512). On February 4, 2000, Park West's counsel executed and submitted a Scheduling
Order to the trial court which order contained no reference to arbitration. (R. 449-451). On
March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their initial disclosures. (R. 478-479). Nowhere in Park
West's initial disclosures did Park West indicate its intent to pursue arbitration. All of these
actions manifested Park West's intent to pursue litigation rather than arbitration.
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Under the analysis in Chandler and the cases cited therein, Park West participated in the
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.4 All of Park West's actions satisfy
the first prong of the Chandler analysis.
B.

CFI Suffered Prejudice as a Result of Park West's Delay in Moving
for Arbitration.

This Court in Chandler identified three forms of prejudice that can result from a
defendant's delay in moving to compel arbitration.
Courts have recognized that prejudice can occur if a party gains an advantage in
arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures. Courts have also stated
that prejudice exists when the party seeking arbitration is attempting to forumshop after "the judicial waters [have]... been tested." In addition, prejudice has
been found in situations where the party seeking arbitration allows the opposing
party to undergo the types of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate,
such as the expense of preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the
expense of conducting discovery procedures that are not available in arbitration.

Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield. 833 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1992) (quoting Wood. 632 P.2d at
1165). "[A]ny real detriment is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice." Id at 360. Each
form of prejudice exists in this case.
4

In its brief, Park West suggests that it preserved its right to arbitrate by sending CFI a letter
demanding arbitration and by referencing the right to arbitrate in a few documents filed with the
Court. Knowing that one may have a right, and exercising that alleged right, are two very
different things. "[TJhere is an affirmative duty to enforce contractual rights." Chandler. 833
P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). If Park West intended to arbitrate, it was obligated to do so, rather
than to pursue the litigation with CFI. At the hearing on it motion to dismiss Park West
acknowledged its "option" of arbitration but clearly made it known that it was holding that
option in abeyance. Counsel for Park West stated: " . . . at the very most, all they have, I guess
I'm saying, and whether we compel arbitration or not, which is certainly an option we all have, is
they have a breach of contract claim for damages." (R.689,11. 1-4) (emphasis added). Later in
the hearing, Park West presented the trial court with two options, neither of which was for
arbitration. Park West's counsel stated: "I guess my point is the Court can do one of two things.
It can dismiss the case outright, based upon my argument; or two, if it feels they have at least
established enough to withstand the motion to dismiss, it can move forward. My suggestion and
what I think the law says is that it can only move forward on a claim of damages...." (R. 685,
11. 19-24). Though Park West knew of its alleged right to arbitrate, it consciously chose not to
exercise that right until four months into the litigation. That constitutes waiver.
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•. . 1. .

Park West Has Gained An Advantage in the Arbitration Through Its
Use of Pretrial Procedures,

Through its Motion to Dismiss, Park West succeeded in disposing of CFI's claim for
specific performance. If, as Park West suggests, all of the disputes regarding the parties'
Contract were subject to arbitration, the arbitrator should also have determined CFI's right to
specific performance. With the decision of the trial court dismissing CFI's claim for specific
performance, and Park West's subsequent development of the Frostwood Parcel with another
developer, CFI has lost forever the right to specific performance under the Contract. Clearly,
Park West has gained a significant advantage in the arbitration to the great prejudice of CFI.
Having taken affirmative advantage of the trail court to eliminate CFI's principal claim, Park
West is hardly in a position to complaint about having to litigate CFFs damages claim in the
same tribunal.

2.

CFI Has Been Prejudiced by Park West's Attempts to Forum-Shop.

Park West filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title seeking to dispose of all of CFI's
claims as a matter of law. Its efforts were only partially successful. CFI's claims for breach of
contract and damages remain. Having failed to obtain complete dismissal of CFI's claims, Park
West then sought a more favorable forum for the resolution of the remaining claims. A forum in
which Park West candidly acknowledges that CFI's only recovery will be the restoration of its
$50,000 earnest money deposit—an amount that does not begin to compensate CFI for its
damages. As recognized in Chandler, this litigation strategy constitutes prejudice.
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3.

Park West's Delay Has Caused CFI to Incur the Types of Costs that
Arbitration Is Designed to Avoid.

CFI was prejudiced by having to respond to Park West's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet
Title. As the Court in Chandler recognized, prejudice may result from "the expense of preparing
to argue important pretrial motions." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. See also Pledger v. Gillespie,
982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999) (noting the prejudice that occurs from "incurring expenses that
would not have been incurred in arbitration, e.g., preparing to argue important pretrial motions or
conducting discovery not available in arbitration."). In addition to the tremendous costs incurred
to defend against Park West's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, CFI incurred additional
unnecessary litigation expenses including the costs to meet and confer with Park West, schedule
litigation dates, prepare Initial Disclosures, and prepare discovery requests to be served on Park
West. CFI was prejudiced from having to incur these additional litigation expenses.
Prior to March 9, 2000, Park West too full advantage of the benefits of litigation. Most
significantly, it sought and obtained from the trial court the dismissal of CFFs primary claim for
specific performance. Only when Park West failed to obtain the dismissal of all CFFs claims,
did it opt to pursue the arbitration of CFFs remaining claims. Park West has cited the Court to
no authority, and none exists, in which courts have allowed for a piecemeal arbitration practice.
If Park West was entitled to arbitrate the claims in the lawsuit, it was obligated to arbitrate all of
those claims, including CFFs claim for specific performance. Because there is no practical way
to restore CFFs claim for specific performance and to allow all claims to proceed to arbitration,
Park West has lost the right to pursue any claims in arbitration. CFI has demonstrated both
prongs of the Chandler waiver test. Judge Hilder could have denied Park West's motion to
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compel on the basis of waiver. Therefore, this Court should affirm Judge Hilder's denial of the
motion to compel on the additional theory of waiver.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, CFI respectfully request this Court to affirm the
district court's denial of Park West's Motion to Compel.

DATED this 28th day of December, 2000.
SNELL & WILMER

orneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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iZa
„
L2 EXCLUDED ITEMS: These Items ere excluded from this sale:
i/a
. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agreea to pay (or the Property as follows:
;
5JLJl4fl. Zantac Money Deposit
»
\2 . SOP , 000. f ^
yr^^t;
L i Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an oaisting aexumable loan (LJwith LJwithout Seller be
^leased of
liability) m (hie approxumte amount with Q Buyer QSeller agreeing to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees. Any net
difference! between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance it Clodag shall then be adjusted in

J
*J0*~y$f^

fy*

-_

P0^

O c a s h Docher

*/*

*—' P*0"* a c o f institutional financing oo terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following: " / *
(interest rate Cor first
period prior to adjustment, «f any);
fl/fl
(amortization period); «*/*
(term). Other than these, the toan terms
shall be the beat obtainable under the loan for which the Buyer applies below.
a From Seller-bcJd financing, ta described in the attached Seller Ptoaactag Addendum.

if,- ^ ^ ayu&fl' * ^ ~

lkJL

^

—

—

—

t ^ ^ , ^ 1 1 ^ Q0Q">i«i««t^ a f Purchase Price m cash at dosing
j
l S r a f l a , 0 0 0 TOTAL PURCHASE PftlCE
X CLOSING. Tbis wnsactieo ihall be closed on or beiere MdUffldwa „ , Cksfitg shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each
other (or to the escrow/tide company), all documents required by this Centred; by the Lender, by written escrow instructions signed by d»e Buyer and the
Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the money* required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the caxrow/tirlc company in the form of
collected or cleared (Unds; and (c) the deed which th« Seller has agreed to deliver under Ssabm 6 has been recorded. Seller and Buyer shall each pay onehaiif of aie escrow Closing fee. unless; otherwise a|7ecd by the panic* in writing- Tunes Md uicnmcms for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed
obligations shall be prorated as set forth m this Section. All deposits on tenancies shall be mmsfcrred to Buyer ae Goslag. Prorations set forth in this Section

a

a

a

««l Estate Pureha«^Carttrset
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^

iVT^n

be made J»S of
date of O w i n g ;
xt
xsJteasion;
Other £ 1 L &
0SSES.SION, Seller shall deliver possession 10 Buyer within
. • .,
P hours after G o * * ^ .
r O N H R ^ A T I O N O F AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract the Lining Agent K a r l or; fjT-Qflfry

_

fl<r

tsents <& Seller D Buyer, and the Sailing Agent
^ntl ^ T ^ i f l
represents LJSeller «Si Buyer. Quyer and Seller
Trm ihti prior to s i t i n g this Cassraef written disclosure of the agency relationship was pmvtded to him/her. (
) Buyer's inmate (
.) Seller's initialsm~£ TO PROPERTY A W TTTLE INSURANCE, (a) Seller has, or shall have s( Casing, free atle to the Property and agrees to convey 9veix l f j | c ]Q
crby B general L J special warranty deed. Crzc of financial encumbrances a* warranted under Section J 0.6: (bj Seller agrees to pay for. and famish
er at Closing with, a current standard form Owner's poliey of title insurance in the amount of the TotaJ Purchase Price; (c) ihc title poiicy shall conform
\ Seller's obligations under subsections (a) and (b). Unlets otherwise agreed wuicrSection 8.4, the cornrnirment shall conform **ith the title insurance
sracrrteat provided under Section 7.L
3 The Quyer elects to obtain a fliU-coverage extended ALTA policy o f title insurance under 6(b). The cost o f this coverage, above inat o f a standard
neTs policy, shall be paid for by the U Buyer S Seller. Alio, the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey, shall be paid for by the O Buyer EISeller.
. T E O F I C U N D E R T A K I N C 3 O ? SELLER AND BUYER.
7.1 SELLER D I S C L O S U R E S . The Seller will deliver to the Buyer the following Seller Dticlaiures no later than the number of calendar days indicated below
ich shall be days after Acceptance:
(day*)
(a) a Salhr property Condition Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller:
30
(b) s commitment for the policy of title insurance fequic*d under Section 6. to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller.
2H
including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment:
(c) a copy Of ail loan documents relating » any loan now existing which will encumber the f reperty a(kr Cosing:
*?0
(d) a copy o f all leases and rental agreement* now ia effect with regard to the Property together with a current, rent roll:
.TO
LJ (c) operating statements o f the Pranerty for Its last ?*/a full fiscal yesr* o f eperaiton plus die current fiscal year
10
through 1 1 ^ .
— - . cert! (ted by (he Seller or by an independent auditor:
S ( f ) tenant Estoppel agreements;
.
J*0
Her agrees to pay any charge for cancel latum of the tide commitment provided under subsection (b).
If Sciler does not provide any of the Sitter Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, Che Buyer may cither waive the particular Seller Disclosure
^uirernent by taking no timely action cr the Buyer may noufy the Seller in writing within
1 ? calendar days after the espirarion of the particular
sctosure lime period that the Seller is in Deftualt under this Contract and that the remedies under Section U are at the Burr's disposal. The holder of the
ornest iMoney Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's writien notice, return to the Quyer tt^ Earnest Money Denoiie wichout Uw requirement of
nher written audiorizarion from the Seller.
7^ QTJYXR UNDERTAKIWCSL The Buyer agrees lo:
I
u
IS (a) Apply for approval of the aasumpuon or tundm^ of ihc toati proceeds described m Section 2 by completing, signing and
delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and docurnentalion required by the Lender and by paying all fees as
Tecvtred by die Lender (including ipptwsal toe) no later than
- 1 5 , „ calendar days after Acceptance; and
«__^__
_ _ —
EJ (b) No later than
3Q calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from the Lender to whom application is made
under subsection (a) a wriuen commitment to approve the assumption of die existing foan or to fund the new loan
subject only to changes of conditions in Buyer's credit worthiness and 10 normal loan dosing precedurca; or. if Buyer
elects* providing the Seller widi absolute assurance, within the same time (rame. that the proceeds required for funding
the Total Purchase Price are available.
______
these Buyer Undertakings arc at the sole expense of the Buyer and are material elements of ihts Cantract for the benefit of both the Buyer and ihc Seller.
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Vaderuklnf, and provide Seller widi written confirmation in the rime agreed above, the Seller may either waive Uie
lanicular Bayer Undertaking requirement by taking no Umely action or the Seller may notify die Buyer m writing within
30 calendar days of the
taptratton of the particular undertaking time period that (he Buyer is in Default under uHta Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 axe al the Sellers
tapes?!. The holder of the Sarweet ftfenay Depesit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Sellers written notice, deliver to ins Seller the Earnest Monty Deposit widiout
he requirement of further written aouusfttauon (bm tha Buyer.
7-3 ADDITIONAL PUS DILIGENCE. Taa Buyer shall undertake the following Additional Due Diligence elements at its own expense and for ia uw,>
benefit for die purpeso of complying with the CeRilagcncles under S*ctxo* I:
(a) Ordering and obtaining sat appraisal of the Property \[ one is not otherwiserequiredunder Section 7J;
(o) Crdcnng and obtaining a survey of the Preperty if one ia not otherwise required under Section 6:
S I (c) Ordering and obtaining any emWronmentalry related study of ihc Property;
S ( d ) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report mgafding. and completing a personal inspection e< the Proparty;
B (e) Koquestlng and obtaining ^artllcaticn that (he Property complies with ail applicable federal, state, and local taws, ordinances, and regulations '.villi
regard to zoning and perrmssiWc use of the Property.
Seller agrees us cooperate folly with Buyers completing these Due DBlgeace matters and to make the Property available as reasonable and necessary for ihc
sarne.
L CONTINGENCIES. This offer is subject as the Buyers approving h\ ics sole discration the Sellar Dfsdossres, lite Bayer Undertaking!, snd Additional 0u«
Diligence matters \n Section 7. However* to Buyer's discretion in approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7J (b) 1% subject to Buyer's covenant
with regard to minimally accepcable Onandnf terms tinder Section 2.
SA Buyer shall have
*5 calendar days after Ihe times specified in Section 7J and 7J for receipt of Seller Disclosures and for completion oi
:aal Estar^ucchaf ewC^ntract

>
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^

^
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d.*.' Hardin, ^

Property at

Buyar vi«* K».Car Plan and initial bulldog- da.i^. w ± *

i^«

CO

3.4. A

paopia »"

^-P,-*-- to tii* buyar, on or bafora 12/1/3 8.

on

9 . 6 Buyar I s r a a p o n a i b l a f o r a l l o f til a ar&tar th&rao and/or connaeciona , on cka saaa
aula a s ena a © l i a r and o t h e r dwvalepara i n v o l v e d w i t h i n tha Canyon* Maotar P l a n .
3 . 7 S o l l a r a a a l l a p p l y f o r , %fith input from buyar, and o b t a i n F i n a l Kaatar P l a n
pproval, a t a a l l a c s axpeaaa, on, o r bafora 3 * l j 1 , U 3 B . nu£**f- ^ / ( W?& £^"""
- /
5 . 8 T h i s t r a n s a c t i o n a b a l l e l o s a on tba aasrliar o f 1 2 / 3 1 / 3 3 o r 15 d&ya a f t a a j ^ r i a l

^xfJ^J
^ M

aatar Plan approval.
\J
3 . 3 S n t i r a agraasaenfc i s aisb5«ct t o Susniifc County Approval o f d a n a i t y , stoning and
da.

he lent* of attached} Addendum 3
^ are incorporated into thi* Coacraet by this reference
1 SELLERS UMITED WARRAHTIESL. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the following:
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-deaa and free of debris and personal belongings;
10.2 Setter wilt deliver possession of the Preporty Co Buyer ^nth chs ptum&tng, plumbed ftswres, heating ecolin^. ventilating: electrical and sprinkler {indoor
ml outdoor) systems, appliances, and fireplaces m working order;
10J Seller will deliver possession of the Treftttxy va Doyer wirtl dw roof and foundation &M of leaks known to Selter;
10L4 Seller will deliver possession of to ?r©p4rcy &» Buya" widi any privaia well or xptit tank ttp*\t\% the Property In working order nod m compliance wtdi
.'ovemmenul regulooons:
10^ Seller wlJI bo respormble for repwns my of Seller's moving-re!i<ed damage to the fronerty;
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring eurrsu all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge alt such
Mgau'ona which Buyer has not so assumed;
tO.7 As o( Gating. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of aa environmental, building, or zoning code violation regarding the Property wiuch lias
WK been resolved.
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRA?TTa3 AWfJ tNCLUDSD fTEMS. Aitar.all eontlngendes have been removed and before Closing, the Qyyer may conduct
a *Nvalfc-dvough* inspection of the Property bo determine whemer or not itcrm wirrantcd by Sdlcr In Section 10.1% 10J. 10J &d 10J are in the warranted
condition and to verify th*t items included in &ctio* l.l ore presently on die Proporty. If any item Is not in the warranted condition, Selter will con-act, repair
or replace it as necessary or, with }im consent of Buyer and {itrequired)Lender, escrow an amount at Cosing to provide tar such repair or replacement. Vrtc
Buyer's failure to conduct a **walk~dtrough* Inspection or to claim during tha "walk-through* inspection that the Property dees not include all items referenced
in Section U or Is not m the condition warranted in Sketiam 10, shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Scaio* LI and of the wtrrannes contained in
Section 10.
12. CIIANCSS QC1RING TRANSACTION. Seller apees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, ao new leases entered into, and oo substantial
alterations or hupiovcmcots to dta Prapovty shall bo undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.
IX AUTHORITY OF SIGtfeHS. IT Buy«r ar Selter «a a corporation, parmershro, tnat. cstste, or other entity, the person signing this Caatract on its bclialf war.
rants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Selter and the heirs or successors \n interest to Buyer or Seller. If die Seller k not die vested Owner of the
?r9psrtf but has control over the vested Owners dispasuion of the Property, the Seller arrets to ssercise this control and deliver ode under this CaocrseC as l(
it had been signed by die vested Owner.
14. COMPLETE COrTntACT. Thi* tmnument (Together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller Disclosure* ) eonsriuues the enure Contrsct
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« K wrinen .greement of d* p^rtia. !«Iudin» . agreement under &eKM « If (•) * « « .pplr. or (e) court order.
ABROGATION. Ettept for « p r e * Mrrutia rn.de m thil Contmet. the provirion. of thil Contract ™)I not «PpJy »««r CI-«o e .
RISK OP LOSS. All rule of low or darrage to the Property thall be home by Seller until OwInCT S E B OFTHE ESSENCE Time b of the e«ene 8 r e d i n g ft. dice, « t (bnh in to . a c t i o n , e ^ u i . * . muet be agreed to « — s by ,11 p ^ . c .
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_
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a Z ^ W m t A C O r r U l C t .
Buyer offer, . purchue ft. froperty on the above term, » d condluon, If SeUer doe, not « « ft. ott.r
' ^ H ^ L - i T t e ;
J^O « • H H
__-.0*-flkr«tar«--*.*ol*rrf*.
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Deer Crest Realty
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Phone: {435} 655-0555,

-

Fax: (435) 645-9483

ADDENDUM NO.i

&

^
iS IS AN E L AODENOUS*
4e of vTUPgyiHi l??fl

SK?

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
O

COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (lha -REPC) wfm an Offer Inference
— , Including alt prior addenda and counteroffers, between

Cautral Florida Invastaanta,
Buyer, and

lac.

P a r k w a a t A a s o c i a t a s and Shaver Craak A s s o c i a t e s
Seller, regarding ifta Property located at
rosfcwood P a r c a l , l o c a t a d a t t a a basa o f °Tha Canyona* s k i
w fedtowwg terms are haratoy Incofpcfatsd as part a( fta REPC:

araa.

4

iW*

. T h i s o f f a r s u p a r c a d a s t a a Raal S a t a t a Purcaasa C o n t r a c t datad A p r i l 2 2 , 1398.
. Buyer a h a l l p u r c h a s e apprgicl«atoly 29 afcr»« s a praparad b y S a l l a r 1 * A r c h i t e c t i n
g r h i b i t 8 A% a t t a c h e d h a r a t o and ^ ^ ^ ^ i L s i S ^ t h a r a o f .
. The P r o p e r t y a h a l l ba conroyad by ^ S ^ S t P w a r r a t i t y Dead.
« S a i l o r s h a l l p r o v i d e Standard Gvnars P o l i c y a t S a i l e r 1 a axpansa.
• 3 a l l ar s h a l l p r o v i d a a, c o p y o f tha survay praparad by Bush a C u a d g a l l .
. Buyar s n a i l submit Buyar* a p l a n t o SxsmdLt County a i s i u l t a n a o u a l y v i t a S a i l o r ' s
submittal.
Tha plan, a a a l l I n c l u d e a r c h i t a c t u r a f o r a 400 u n i t fciaaahara p r o j act«
. Tha d a a i c n ap*|^JLccation o f tha 9 ? a e p l a Mbvar* B u s t ba a c c a p t a b l a t o tha Canyons
R a s o r t ^ x t h i n s c f f i E l a t i o n and c o a t Co b* approvad by. d s l l a r .
, Buyar u n d e r s t a n d s and a g r o a s t o taa f o l l o w i n g *
.-a) Susaoit County ha* a t a t a d t h a t i t s p r a £ a r r a d davalopmant i s t i a a s h a r a , incarvaJL
/
a*narshlp, or a o t a l / a o t a l .
b) S a l l a r , cm i t s Mastar ? l s n , ha* an a d d i t i o n a l 257 u n i t a o f whola o w a r a h i p
*
i n c l u d i n g €2 r a a i d a n t i a l l o t s , whi<?h s h a l l raaaJLn aueh a f t a r Buyar*a County
approvals ara raeaivad.
*y fimm-tf rmmty^and taa Canyeas^juva^^ndicafcad a s o v e r a l l squara f o o t p a r s m a t a r
o f a p p r o x i m a t a i y •050,000 -to. gsaj&fi) squara f s a t .
d) I t a*ay b^ n a c a s a a r y t o o b t a i n firnaa Summit County a w a i v a r f o r tha a d d i t i o n a l
aquar* f o o t a g s i n taa tisMshara p o r t i o n , n a c a s a a r y f o r Buyara r a q u i r a d u n i t s .
^ pa
a) IItf fcba
b« o b t a i n e d , t ah i as c o n t r a c t 9*Y
BAy bba
t b a a d d i t i o n a l squara f eo o t a g a* c a n n o t ba
t^j/
c a n c a l l a d i n n^ritiag
A
vui.
tfefl^*^
.
w i t l a g &T a«iti»ar
i t h a r Buyar o r S a l l a r flallar.
.
Cr*JL
\£»(L**"^V^
T h i s t r a n s a c t i o n s h a l l o l o a a on t a a a a r l i a r o f 15 daya a f t a ^ a p p r o v a ^ o f ^ B u y a r ' a
t i a a a a a r a p r o j a c t o r Oaoaabar 31 # 1599 •
10« Taa r a l a a a a p r i e a o f a i t n # r squara f o o t a g o o r acraaga s h a l l ba a t 120% o f p a r .
A l l a c r a a s h a l l ba r a l a a a a d by tba fiallar o n l y , on a r a l a a a a ach.9&il+ approvad by
tha 5 « l X « r .
1 1 . d a l l a r a h a l l " s t u b 0 roaoa t o tl^aaaara p r o p a r t y on taraa aidaa tf vhicb, a r a a o r t a ,
aoufcn, and a a a t , a t BaXlar^a aapanaa. Buyar a b a l l c o n s t r u c t a l l i n t e r i o r r o a d s t o
a+zrrm tiataabara p r o j a c t a t Buyar'a ascpanaa.
1 2 . Any d i s a g r a r a a n t o v a r t b a tazma of t a i l a g r a a a a n t s a a l l ba a x b i t r a t a d b y p a r t i a a
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1 I

Then it goes through and says, "Nothing in this

2

section shall prohibit the buyer from seeking specific

3

performance," and also "The parties may agree in writing to

4

waive mediation."

5

to mediate.

6

Well, the parties agreed to arbitrate, not

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

From the first reading of that

7

language, that 60-day provision, it's always troubled me in

8

the back of my mind that when it talked about failure to reach

9

agreement in 60 days, that's more a mediation concept than an

10

arbitration concept.

So I don't think it helps —

it's just

11 I another confusion to me, but it's a confusion.
12

MR. GAYLORD: Whether it's a mediation or arbitration

13

concept, your Honor, the key is what's the remedy in the end.

14

What the parties contracted for is whether it's a mediation or

15

an arbitration, what the parties contracted for is the remedy,

16

and that's what's important here.

17

The remedy is contract —

they get back here this

18

morning, and the contract is null and void if they can't reach

19

an agreement on the terms of the dispute.

20
21

THE COURT: But you don't reach an agreement on an
arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord?

It's imposed upon you.

22

MR. GAYLORD: Ordinarily, yes, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Yes, and then it comes to one other issue

24

for me that no one raised directly, but it troubled me, too, as

25

I read.

That is, in this case —

I mean, what I said in the

-9
1

minute entry I think is correct.

There was definitely an

2

intent to not let this drag out, but isn't it possible that

3 I this is a sham in the sense that if you can —

if this is sort

4

of an agreement thing, if I say, "Arbitrate," you have your 60-

5

day provision, if it can just be dragged out 60 days, it's all

6

over.

7

It could be —

the whole intent could be thwarted.

MR. GAYLORD: Certainly the intent to be thwarted, I

8

guess if there's any cause of action that it stems from, is if

9

there was a bad faith effort in the context of the arbitration.

10

THE COURT: Yeah.

11

MR. GAYLORD: If somehow we don't have a reasonable

12

effort to try and reach an agreement.

What the arbitration

13

provision provides, I think, is the arbitration provision

14

provides that, look, we have a Real Estate Purchase Contract

15

that was entered into early on in the process.

16

what Summit County was going to do.

17

hoped for, and if we could meet those terms and conditions

18

based upon a collective effort, not just by Park West, but

19

by CFI.

We didn't know

This is what they had

20

As the Court may recall, one of the factors the Court

21

looked at in whether specific performance could be implied, is

22

was there an impossibility of performance, and whether or not

23

CFI had complied with its side of the bargain.

24

think, found that it didn't.

25

So

—

THE COURT: Uh-huh, I remember.

The Court, I

-10MR. GAYLORD: And so we're sitting at a point where we
have two parties who may want to still structure a deal, so
they have an arbitration clause that says, "Look, if we don't
have the agreement as we've currently written it, we've got an
arbitration clause.

Let's see if we can sit down and negotiate

a new deal."
If we can't, all you're going to do is get back
your earnest money.

We don't want to have to waste our time

fighting over, you know, whether you have what you have, and
if they don't, they get a null and void.

It's rendered null

and void because they don't want to delay it any further, if
they can't reach an agreement on what the development will look
like.
So that's what the purpose of the agreement was, and
that's what both sides will say.
had an arbitration clause.
to it.

Both sides will say that they

They put it in there.

They agreed

Yet they couldn't reach an agreement on an arbitration

if there was a dispute over the terms of the contract, because
there is a dispute over what happens to the earnest money.
They think they get to file a litigation, pursuant to
paragraph 15.

Our position is they don't.

Why don't they?

Because if you look at two things; one, if you look at the
addendum, it says, "To the extent the terms of this addendum
modify or conflict with any provisions of the RVPC, including
all prior addendum counter offers, these terms shall control."

A

-11I submit that there was a conflict between these two,
because the conflict arises from the disposition of the earnest
money deposit.

If you look down here, paragraph 12 tells you

what the disposition of the earnest money contract is —
is, if they can't reach agreement on the arbitration.
it gets back, and that's it.
and file a lawsuit."

money
It is,

They say, "No, we can go ahead

There's a conflict there.

More importantly is, under subsection 16 of the RAPC
it says, "Where a section of this contract provides a specific
remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive,
regardless of rights, which might otherwise be available under
common law."
The exclusive remedy under this arbitration clause is
that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void.
the remedy.

That's

They agreed when they signed the deal that they

wouldn't litigate this case, because of the time frames that
they were operating under.
Yeah, they want to now bring back 15 and say, "But we
can file a lawsuit.

If we first mediate, and if we don't have

successful mediation, then we're going to proceed with our
litigation.
I submit that this was to wipe out paragraph 15, and
intended to be a replacement.

It's in direct conflict with

that, and it can't be read together, and because it can't be
read together, it must file the addendum.

The addendum is

-12controlling.
To address the issue of waiver, your Honor, unless the
Court has any other questions.
THE COURT: No, I confess I don't.

I think I agree

with you, and I'll hear argument, that as a general rule, the
addendum should control, but if the addendum doesn't really
provide anything, then I'm wondering where we are.

That's

where I'm struggling; if it really does provide an arbitration
option.
Generally when we order arbitration we're saying,
"This is not going to be your forum.

Arbitration is.

You

are going to get a binding decision out of a neutral partial
arbitration," supposedly.
Here, though, it's such a hybrid of arbitration and
mediation, with the ability to say that if agreement doesn't
occur within 60 days, you've got nothing except —
this was the intent —
money.

and maybe

you've got nothing but the earnest

We're all moving on because the project is paramount

thing here.

Is that what you're saying?

MR. GAYLORD: Well, in fact, I think that's exactly
what Mr. Segal is saying in his affidavit.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. GAYLORD: He's suggesting in his affidavit that
time is of the essence.
essence clause.

In the contract it has a time of the

He says, "Based upon my visit with Brent
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., '

Plaintiff,

)
)

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
TO QUIET TITLE

1

Civil No. 990600361CR

>

Judge Pat Brian

vs.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, Park West
Associates ("Park West") and Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA"),
by and through their counsel, hereby move that the Court enter an order dismissing this action filed
by plaintiff, Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), and releasing the notice of lis pendens

UT DOCS_A 1030391 v 1

A Ci £ 1

recorded against the subj ect property. This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title.
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase contract that
automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven months ago. The contract provided that
closing would occur on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or fifteen days after Final Master Plan
approval, that the "[e]ntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning
and use/' and that time was of the essence. Because Summit County never gave its approval, and
the transaction failed to close by December 31,1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated
by its own terms on December 31, 1998. Therefore, PWA respectfully requests that this Court
dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the grounds that CFI cannot state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
At a minimum, however, this Court should release the lis pendens, which was recorded
against the entire seventy-five-acre Frostwood parcel. The lis pendens constitutes a wrongful lien
under Utah law. In addition, CFFs claims are barred by laches because over eleven months has
passed since the Purchase Contract terminated, and PWA has expended valuable time and resources
to obtain Summit County's approval of the development of over 7,000 acres within The Canyons
Specially Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"). Finally, because the lis pendens threatens to
irreparably harm the viability of The Canyons SPA in its entirety, the equities dictate that this Court
immediately release the lis pendens. For these reasons, PWA respectfully requests that the Court
grant this Motion.

UT_DOCS_A 1030391 v 1

-2-

nnan

DATED this 8th day of December, 1999.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Park West Associates and
Beaver Creek Associates
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 8th day of December 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO QUIET TITLE to be mailed by certified mail, return
receipt requested, to:
David A. Siegel, President and
Chairman of the Board
Central Florida Investments, Inc.
5601 Windhover Drive
Orlando, FL 32819
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS,
INC.,

I

Case No. 990600361 CR
SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff,
Honorable Robert Hilder
vs.
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and BEAVER
CREEK ASSOCIATES,
Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f)(3), and by stipulation of the parties and
their counsel, the following matters have occurred and/or are scheduled as indicated.
I.

ATTORNEY'S SCHEDULING CONFERENCE: Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.

26(f)(1), a telephonic meeting was held on February 4, 2000, at 10:00 a.m.
A.

The following participated in the telephonic scheduling conference:

Robert W. Payne, Esq. representing plaintiff Central Florida Investments, Inc., and Mark

0440

R. Gaylord, Esq. representing defendants Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek
Associates.
B.

The parties have discussed the nature and basis of their claims and

defenses.
II.

INITIAL DISCLOSURE: On or before March 3, 2000, the parties will exchange

information required by Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
HI.

DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties jointly propose to the court the following

discovery plan:
A.

FACT DISCOVERY
1.

All fact discovery will be completed no later than August 31, 2000.

2.

Fact discovery will be limited in accordance with Rules 30 and 33

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

EXPERT DISCOVERY
1.

Expert discovery shall proceed according to Rules 26(a)(3) and

26(b)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The identity and Rule 26(a)(3)(B) reports of's retained experts will

be submitted by the parties on or before September 29, 2000.
3.

The identity and Rule 26(a)(3)(B) reports of any rebuttal experts

will be submitted by the parties on or before November 1, 2000.
4.

Depositions of retained experts shall be conducted in accordance

with Rule 26(B)(4)(A).

2
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IV.

OTHER ITEMS
A.

The cutoff date for amending pleadings, including joining of additional

parties, is March 30, 2000.
B.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is

February 15,2001.
C.

Pretrial disclosures shall be made in accordance with Rule 26(a)(4) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
D.

The parties request the Court to hold a telephonic Pretrial Conference

pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of scheduling
dates for the final pretrial conference and for trial of this matter.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2000.

BY THE COURT

Robfert Hilder
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

y
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Mark R. Gaylord
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Parkwest Associates
and Beaver Creek Associates
PAYNER\SLC\116465.1
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